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ABSTRACT 
 
This study examines the relationship between firm ownership and corporate performance in Saudi 
Arabia, using a sample of Listed Private Companies (LPCs) and Listed Government Related 
Companies (LGRCs).  The study compares the operating and market performance of the LPCs and 
LGRCs during the period 2000-2003 and found that, in general, LGRCs outperform or match the 
performance of LPCs. More specifically, the study finds that LGRCs tend to mostly outperform 
LPCs in terms of profitability, as measured by Return on equity (ROE) and Net Profit Margin 
(NPM), operating efficiently, as measured in terms of Return on assets (ROA), and match them in 
their stock market risk adjusted performance. The study concludes that these results may have 
implications for the issue of privatization programs which the government has recently started. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
  
ompanies wholly or partially owned by the government in Saudi Arabia have a strong influence and 
significant presence in the Saudi Arabian corporate sector. People in Saudi Arabia, including many 
academics, professionals, and businessmen have frequently called for the government to fully privatize 
those entities, and a few of them seem to be satisfied with a temporarily significant reduction of government 
ownership. In a survey conducted by Al-Sarhan and Persley (2001), it was found that 91 percent of businessmen 
surveyed support privatizing state-owned enterprises.  
 
 These views have been driven mainly by the deep rooted belief in the Middle East and elsewhere, as a 
matter of fact, that government entities are crippled with inefficiencies and waste of resources and that they may do 
better if placed under the private ownership or under some form of contractual management. 
 
 However, those types of arguments, I belief, may not hold in the case of Saudi Arabia for two reasons. 
First, it should be noted that economic development in Saudi Arabia and in the wider Gulf region, has been 
pioneered and led by government wholly or partially-owned corporations. Main among these are the oil and gas 
companies, such as, the petrochemical giant Saudi Arabian Basic Industries Company (SABIC) and the Saudi 
Arabian Oil Company (ARAMCO), the world largest oil company,  as well as other successful companies in other 
economic sectors. Those pioneered companies have accumulated a solid technical and management experience and 
had first hand exposure and working relations with foreign companies and business parties in the developed world.  
In the period that followed oil discovery in Saudi Arabia, the government assumed a proactive entrepreneurial role 
by establishing state enterprises in key sectors such as oil and gas, transport, marine services, and basic industries. 
The private sector was almost completely engrossed in trading activities and some lightweight industries. Second, In 
the case of Saudi Arabia, it can be argued that the state fully- or partially-owned corporations have been genuine 
profit-oriented entities, and they compete with their private counterparts in various economic sectors, and many of 
them have been partially privatized and listed on the local stock exchange, Tadawul . Al-Barrak and Al-Harran 
(2007) argued that in Saudi Arabia competitive market forces are the most important in determining the level of 
efficiency not the form of ownership of the organization. Their study reached a conclusion that privatization is one 
C 
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and not necessarily the best driver of efficiency of the state – owned enterprises in Saudi Arabia. Such view is 
supported by similar studies carried out within the region such as the one by Dawley and Haidar (2008) which 
investigated the impact of privatization on value creation in State – owned enterprises in the Middle East and North 
Africa (MENA) region. The study found that success of privatizing state–owned enterprises needs to coincide with 
strong reform policies and clear financial and managerial strategies. 
 
Thus, the purpose of this study is to investigate the differences in operating and market performance 
between the Saudi Listed Private Companies (LPCs) and the Saudi Listed Government-Related Companies 
(LGRCs). Such a study will help to shed light on the need for fully privatized programs, the speed and pace of such 
programs and the effect of government presence in the corporate sector in Saudi Arabia. 
 
Using data on publicly listed LPCs and LGRCs over the period 2000-2003, this study considers two 
specific questions: 
 
1. Does the operating performance of the Saudi LPCs exceed that of the Saudi LGRCs? 
2. Does the under-or out-performance, if any, translate into market performance for shareholders in the stock 
market. 
 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section II reviews the literature on the performance of 
state – owned enterprises and private companies. The data and methodology are described in section III. Section IV 
presents the results and analysis and finally section V summarizes and concludes the study. 
 
II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
It has long been the conviction that public enterprises or government-administered organizations are more 
concerned with social, political and all but economic outcomes of business activities. In the Orient, especially in the 
Arab world, most of the managers of government-related corporations are mainly civil servants or retired military 
staffs who lack real business keenness and talents. Moreover, their investment and business decisions may be, to a 
large extent, politically, rather than commercially motivated. The less efficiency is due also to their investment 
relationship with the government, and the management systems applied within. What make matters worse is that 
these managers are generally too risk averse, and have no incentives to venture into risky but otherwise 
economically rewarding projects. 
 
It is argued by many that this loss of efficiency is attributed in part to ownership effects. Boycko et al 
(1996) stated that politicians cause government-linked corporations (GLCs) to employ excess labor input. Further, 
as argued by Krueger (1990), the GLCs may be pressured to hire politically connected people rather than tapping the 
market for professionals, or just pursuing other than profit maximizing goal (Ramamutri, 1987). It is, however, 
argued by Jones (1991) that corporatizations can provide management of government owned enterprises with clear 
goals around which government policies must be formulated. A related reason usually put forward as a possible 
explanation for the less efficient performance by GLCs is the government rigid and bureaucratic supervision of these 
institutions (form not substance) (Chang and Singh 1997). Additionally, there is almost complete absence of 
incentives for managers to pursue efficiency and profitability for their institutions.   Easy access to government 
cheap, guaranteed, or recommended financing may lower managers’ drive towards efficient utilization of resources, 
and reduce threats of jobs loss, job advancement or even bankruptcy. However, state–owned enterprises in some 
countries performed poorly even after reforms were introduced (Christensen 1998). 
 
Moreover, it may be argued that the principal – agent relationship of the type depicted in the work of Fama 
(1980) and Fama and Jensen (1983) is not as strict or as profit- oriented as in privately-owned companies. The 
objective in public or government linked companies is not to pursue profit maximization goals, but rather to ensure 
that rules and regulations are adhered to and followed even sometimes at the expenses of profitability. Vickers and 
Yarrow (1991) argue that privatization could improve performance of publicly-owned organizations and solve the 
agency problem and improve efficiency.  
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These lines of arguments found some support in empirical studies in this area. For example, Ahuja and 
Majumdar (1998) examined the performance of 68 Indian state-owned enterprises in the manufacturing sector 
during the 1987-1991 period. The study found that state- owned enterprises were posting lower performance than 
their privately-owned counterparts. Similarly, Dewenter and Malatesta (2001) used a large data set for GLCs and 
non GLCs which are included in Fortune magazine’s Global 500 for 1975, 1985, and 1995. Their results indicate 
that GLCs are significantly less profitable than privately-owned firms. Evidence for the inferior performance of 
GLCs can be traced also in array of studies that have been initially directed to examine the effect of privatization on 
corporate performance. For example, a recent study by Farinos et al (2007) found significant operating performance 
improvement in Spanish state-owned enterprises privatized through public share issue offerings during the 1990-
2001 period. 
 
On the other hand, GLCs out-performance has also found comparable empirical support in the literature. 
Some authors contend that GLCs are not always inherently less efficient than private corporations. Private firms 
may, at times, pose inferior efficiency output than government-owned ones. Among the cited reasons of possible 
inefficiency in private enterprises (non GLCs), is the inadequacy of corporate governance. Even bureaucracy may be 
a common factor in these situations (Chang and Singh 1997). Further arguments in defense of GLCs rest on the 
concentrated government ownership in GLCs.  For example, Dewenter and Malatesta (1997) argue that the 
government, as a blockholder in GLCs, is in a better position to closely monitor the GLCs managers than dispersed 
owners in private corporations. 
 
Some studies tried to seek conceptual examination of ownership structure outside the dual public-private 
ownership context. A study by McGuiness, et al (2005) considered two forms of ownership structure of Chinese-
listed companies. Mainly, the study examined the effects of state and foreign ownership on the listed Chinese 
corporations’ performance. The study examined state-owned enterprises with substantial foreign ownership. The 
study found negative association between free-float size and corporate performance. Additionally, the study found 
that in spite of the sizable foreign ownership state, such stakes are not significantly associated with corporate 
performance. 
 
The question of whether the financial market rewards or penalizes the state ownership is examined by 
Ramurez and Tan (2004) in a study that sampled government–linked corporations in Singapore that were run on a 
competitive commercial basis. The study found evidence that being a GLC is rewarded in financial markets with a 
positive premium over a normal Tabin’s Q.   
 
Some argue that government ownership represents an important signal to the market since it gives company 
credibility and also assures investors and markets, contractors, and suppliers because of the government readiness to 
insure transactions with these parties. A study by Bourdman & Vining (1989) examined samples of three ownership- 
based categories of companies: state-owned, privately-owned, and mixed-owned. The study found that, partial 
privatization, with the government retaining some equity ownership, was found a viable and a better strategy for a 
government that plans to move away from state ownership form. A study by Ang & Ding (2006) compares the 
financial and market performance of GLCs and non GLCS in Singapore and found that the GLCs have better 
corporate governance and higher valuations compared to non GLCs. Omran (2004) also have shown that Egyptian 
privatized firms do not exhibit significant improvement in performance compared with state-linked corporations. 
Similar results, but for different reasons, were exhibited by studies in highly developed economies such as the one 
by Bozec (2003) in Canada and Kole and Mulherin (1997) in the United States.  The U. S. study found that in the 
U.S., corporations where government owned an interest (between 35-100%) showed performance not statistically 
different than that of private sector firms in the same industry. They attribute their results to the existence of similar 
monitoring mechanism in the government–owned corporations to that of private sector firms. 
 
Similarly, a recent and more comprehensive study was conducted by Micco et al (2007) where it examined 
a large sample of commercial banks in 179 countries during the period 1995-2002. The objective of the study was to 
examine the relationship between bank ownership and performance and to test whether there is a political factor 
effect. State-owned banks operating in developing countries tend to have lower profitability, lower margins and 
higher overhead costs than their privately-owned counterparts. This relationship was weaker in the case of industrial 
countries. 
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III. DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
 
The data used in this study includes all private and state-related corporations listed on Saudi stock market, 
Tadawul, during the period 2000-2003. This study window is chosen for many reasons. First, before 2000, there was 
not much interest by the public in the ownership issue and in the corporate sector performance.  The interest in 
corporate sector and the spread of corporate culture is a recent trend in the kingdom. However, the government 
showed enthusiasm for privatization and took practical steps by forming the Saudi Arabian General Investment 
Authority (SAGIA) in 2000, which spearheaded the privatization program in the kingdom.  Earlier in August 1997, 
the Cabinet issued decree No. 60 that established the objectives of the privatization in Saudi Arabia, while decree 
No. 257, which was issued later in February 2001, assigned responsibility of the privatization program to the 
Supreme Economic Council, headed by the King. Second, the year 2004 witnessed the establishment of the Capital 
Market Authority (CMA), which was assigned the oversight of the Saudi stock market. Third, many companies were 
listed following the establishment of the CMA and they were relatively newly established or turned into public 
companies. Fourth, during 2000-2003 periods, the Saudi economy and stock market were stable, and there was 
almost no major structural change that may interfere with the primary analysis at hand. 
 
Thus, we include all listed companies on the Saudi stock exchange, Tadawul, which are either 100% 
privately owned or partially owned by government, since there is no listed company which is wholly owned by the 
government. The partially government-owned sample includes those companies in which the government owned 
small percentage that does not constitute an effective ownership. However, still these small shares are considered to 
be sizable and influential in management and control. This is due in part to the pattern of the shares ownership in 
Saudi Arabia. Most shares in the Saudi market are owned by individual shareholders (94-96 percent) who own small 
amounts of shares. Thus, sometimes a 1% share ownership in a company places the government as the largest 
shareholder and therefore entails significant control over the affairs of the company. Table 1 shows the government 
ownership in various economic and stock market sectors. 
 
 
Table (1) 
Government Ownership in Stock Market Sectors 
Economic Sector 
Total No. of 
Companies 
No. of Companies  
with govt. ownership 
Average 
ownership (%) 
Range 
of ownership (%) 
Banking 11 9 13 % 0-29 % 
Industrial 25 6 20.2 % 0-70 % 
Cement 9 6 21.9 % 0-39.9 % 
Services 19 7 28.4 % 0-72.9 % 
Agriculture 9 3 20.8 % 0-40 % 
Electricity * 1 1 74 % 74-74 % 
Communications** 1 1 70 % 70-70 % 
Total 75 33   
* Electricity listed companies were combined in one big listed company in 1999. 
**Communication sector was dominated by government ownership, (Saudi Telecom Company) until 2000, where the 
government offered 30% of its shares to private ownership through a public offer. 
 
 
The operating and market data for the variables chosen in this study, to measure the performance of the 
sampled private and government-related corporations comes from Tadawul website. It includes the audited financial 
statement and shares closing market prices of these companies. The study uses three indices to measure operating 
performance.  
 
1. Operating efficiency surrogated by return on assets 
2. Profitability which is defined in terms of return on equity and net profit margin 
3. Productivity which is defined in term of Sales efficiency 
 
On the other hand market performance is introduced through two measures. 
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1. Stock Return which is defined as annual changes in shares prices 
2. Risk which is defined in term of daily standard deviation of returns 
    
 
Table (2) summarizes these measures and shows their definitions: 
 
 
Table (2) 
Measures of Performance and their definitions: 
 Indicator Variable Symbol 
Operating Performance Operating efficiency Return on Assets ROA 
Profitability (i) Net Profit Margin 
(ii) Return on Equity 
NPM 
ROE 
Productivity Turnover (sales) per employee TPE 
Market Performance Return Annul stock return RET 
Risk Daily Standard Deviation of Returns SD 
 
 
These variables are calculated for each company included in the study over the four-year period. Although 
other measures of performance are legitimate candidates for use in this study, such as EVA or cost and expenditure 
efficiency indicators, a study by Eljelly & Algurair (2001) has shown that EVA does not correlate well with stock 
prices in Saudi Arabia. Moreover, most studies tend to conclude that earnings and profits are significant measures of 
corporate performance. Besides their availability, they have high correlation with other performance measures such 
as cash flow measures of performance (see Eljelly & Algurair 2001). The authors also showed that traditional 
(accounting-based) measures explained stocks price changes in Saudi Arabia. 
 
On the other hand, Monczka and Morgan (2000) state that companies’ managements find it easy and 
convenient to use the traditional indicators of company’s performance such as ROA and measures of company stock 
performance. A study by Roztocki and Needy (1998) found that small companies rely on traditional measures of 
performance as primary indicators of their business performance. 
 
It is clear from the table that the government ownership spread over all stock market (economic) sectors. 
The size of government ownership is highest in the electricity & communication sectors where the government owns 
most of the shares of two companies that comprise the two sectors. Government ownership in some companies is 
very small, but still has strong influence as discussed previously. 
 
IV. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS:  
 
 Table (3) shows the results for the sample period (2000-2003) for all the companies listed on Tadawul. 
 
 
Table (3) 
Performance of LPCs and  LGRCs 
(2000-2003) 
Operating  Performance  LPCs LGRCs t-statitics N p 
Efficiency ROA 2.86 6.13 3.8 283 .000 * 
Profitability ROE .0637 .1097 3.38 283 .001* 
 NPM .1368 .2147 1.46 283 .145 
Productivity TPE 1588 1013 1.56 244 .12 
Market Performance       
Annual Return RET .353 .271 1.17 281 .24 
Daily Standard Deviation SDd .038 .032 2.94 281 .004* 
Annualized Standard Deviation SDa .647 .55 2.94 281 .004* 
Coefficient of Variation RARET .546 .493 .593 281 .554 
SDa = SDd ×√290 
* Significant at all levels of significance 
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Table (3) shows that LGRCS performed at least as good as the privately owned companies (LPCs) with 
respect to all measures of performance. They have higher and statistically significant Return on Assets Ratio (ROA) 
(efficiency), Return on Equity (ROE), and higher Net Profit Margin (NPM) (21.47%) than LPCs (13.68%) 
(Profitability).  However, the private companies show higher productivity (sales/turnover by employee) than the 
government-related companies. 
 
 However, the LGRCs failed to translate these operating gains and efficiencies into stock market gains for 
investors. The annual return for holders of private company stocks are higher (35.3%) than the partially-owned 
public corporations (27.1 %), although with associated higher annual standard deviation of 64.4% compared to 55% 
for the government related companies. 
 
 The comparatively low stock market performance by the government related companies is due to the low 
trading activity.  It is generally observed that stocks, in which the government owns a significant stake, have lower 
daily trading volumes and trading values.  The reason for lower trading activity is due to the long-term investment 
nature of government ownership. This has eventually led Tadawul Company to introduce a free float index from 
which government ownership is excluded.  
 
 Table (4) shows the correlation coefficients between the various performance variables and the government 
ownership as well as among the performance variables themselves. The correlation coefficients in the first column 
as well as their level of significance indicate the presence of strong real relationship between the government 
ownership variable and all the operating and market performance measures.  We also observe the high and 
significant correlations among the various performance measures. 
 
 
Table (4) 
Pearson Correlation Matrix 
 Gov. ROA ROE PM SD RET SECT TPE 
ROA .221* 
(.000) 
       
ROE .198* 
(.001) 
.824* 
(.000) 
      
PM .087 
(.145) 
.435* 
(000) 
.499* 
(.000) 
     
SD .173* 
(.004) 
-.084 
(.161) 
-.125** 
(.037) 
-.093 
(.120) 
    
RET -.069 
(.246) 
-104*** 
(.083) 
.041 
(.494) 
.001 
(.98) 
.153** 
(.01) 
   
SECT .179* 
(.003) 
-.117** 
(.05) 
-.362* 
(.000) 
-.287* 
(.000) 
.018 
(.77) 
.054 
(.365) 
  
TPE -.10 
(.12) 
-.037 
(.565) 
-.052 
(.420) 
-.041 
(.52) 
-.025 
(.702) 
.065 
(.315) 
-.082 
(.202) 
 
Log Asset .381* 
(.000) 
.100 
(.094) 
.462* 
(.000) 
.285* 
(.000) 
-.226* 
(.000) 
-.091* 
(.129) 
-.337* 
(.000) 
-.008 
(.897) 
* significant at the 1% level 
** significant at the 5% level 
*** significant at the 10% level 
All symbols as defined before. In addition : 
SECT: sector of the stock market 
Log Asset: Logarithm of Company’s total assets  
 
 
The next step is to use pooled regression analysis to estimate the effect of ownership as well as other 
control variables on companies’ performance. Thus, a regression model is specified in order to combine other 
independent variables that may affect the chosen measure of performance. The variables are percentage of 
government ownership (the magnitude of ownership) (OWN) in the specific company, the sector or industry in 
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which the company operates (SECT), and the size of the listed company (SIZE). Thus, the regression model takes 
the following form: 
 
PERFit = α + B1 OWNit + B2 SIZEit +     + ei 
 
Where: 
 
PERFit=  (i) Return on Assets (ROA) 
       (ii) Return on Equity (ROE) 
       (iii) Net Profit Margin (NPM) 
        (iv) Turnover per employee (TPE) 
       (v) Annual Return (RET) 
          (vi) Standard deviation of returns (SD) 
OWNit = percentage of government ownership in the shares of company i at time t  
SIZEit = size of company i(as measured by log of total assets) at time t. 
SECTj = Economic sector to which a sampled company belongs. 
 
 
Table (5) 
Regression: PERFi = α + B1 OWNi + B2 SIZEi +     + ei 
 ROA ROE NPM TPE RET SD 
Regressor       
Intercept -5.374 
(1.26) 
-19.13* 
(3.03) 
-57.75** 
(1.97) 
2.489* 
(2.82) 
.0092 
(0.02) 
.53** 
(2.34) 
OWN .043*** 
(1.71) 
.0123 
(.33) 
-.023 
(.13) 
.0004 
(.07) 
.0014 
(.05) 
-.00023 
(.17) 
SIZE .445 
(1.38) 
1.62* 
(3.4) 
4.16*** 
(1.88) 
.234* 
(3.46) 
-.015 
(.50) 
-.042** 
(2.43) 
SECT1 -.605 
(.29) 
9.97* 
(3.31) 
34.18** 
(2.44) 
.294 
(.67) 
.439** 
(2.25) 
.224** 
(2.06) 
SECT2 1.81* 
(2.64) 
2.33** 
(2.3) 
9.788** 
(2.07) 
.58* 
(3.97) 
.302* 
(4.56) 
.119* 
(3.24) 
SECT3 5.09* 
(9.09) 
5.53* 
(6.59) 
4.33 
(1.11) 
.196 
(1.27) 
.215* 
(3.96) 
.033 
(1.10) 
SECT4 .580 
(1.62) 
.605 
(1.14) 
7.8* 
(3.16) 
.201* 
(2.62) 
.174* 
(5.04) 
.038** 
(2.005) 
SECT5 -.419 
(.69) 
-.825 
(.922) 
-1.26 
(.304) 
.034 
(.331) 
.042 
(.72) 
.032 
(1.0) 
SECT6 -.0113 
(.044) 
-.034 
(.089) 
-1.51 
(.85) 
-.143* 
(2.64) 
.099* 
(3.98) 
.034** 
(2.48) 
       
R2 .354 .38 .168 .315 .105 .099 
F 18.54* 20.53* 6.825* 13.39* 3.91* 3.69* 
P value .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 
N 279 279 279 279 276 276 
*indicates significance at .01 level of significance 
** indicates significance at .05 level of significance 
*** indicates significance at .10 level of significance 
-t values between parentheses.  
 
 
The regression analysis indicates a significant positive relationship between most of profitability and 
efficiency measures and size. In the ROA regression, there were differences among various sectors (industries) with 
respect to their significance as determinants of variation in performance.  However, the magnitude of government 
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ownership has no significant effect on performance as measured by ROA, while the magnitude of government 
ownership has significant impact on ROA. 
 
ROA, on the other hand, is significantly affected by the economic sector in which a company is operating, 
the size of the company, but not the magnitude of government ownership. The signs of the size coefficient is 
positive indicating an effect of economies of scale, while the sector coefficient sign is high and positive especially 
for SECT1 (the banking sector), which is plausible given the high profitability of the banking sector and the low 
capital provided by shareholders. For NPM and TPE the size effect is significant and positive indicating also 
economies of scale factor in performance. The economic sector coefficients show different signs and significance 
levels indicating varying performance among sectors. 
 
For the market performance indicators, both return and risk vary widely between economic sectors. 
However, only risk varies significantly negatively with size indicating the lower risk of large (blue chip) companies 
relative to smaller ones.  Both market performance variables are not affected by the magnitude of government 
ownership.  
 
V. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
 
 This study examines the relationship between form of corporate ownership and corporate performance 
among Saudi listed companies.  The objective is to compare the operating and market performance of Listed Private 
Companies (LPCs) with Listed Government Related Companies (LGRCs). 
 
 The study finds that on average LGRCs significantly outperform LPCs with respect to profitability, and do 
better in efficiency measures, although the differences are   not always significant.  Correlation results show 
significant relations between the performance measures and government ownership. Pooled regression analysis 
shows that some measures of performance are affected by the size of the company, the magnitude of government 
ownership and the economic sector in which company operates. With respect to market performance, the two 
categories of ownership show comparable performance on risk adjusted basis.  
 
 The results of this study may shed light on the debate relating to the issue of complete or partial 
privatization of the still wholly owned government enterprises, and the best form of transfer or transition to use.  
 
NOTES 
 
The opinions expressed in this paper and the results obtained are that of the author and do not necessarily 
reflect the opinion of the Capital Market Authority (CMA) of Saudi Arabia. 
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